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## THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE

*Improvements will come in the future as the United Nations gain experience with the machinery and methods which they have set up. For this is not a static treaty. It can be improved – and, as the years go by, it will be – just as our own Constitution has been improved.*

**Harry S. Truman**

**Lt Col Stephen D. Brown**  
**FA: Col Hughes**

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## THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE

The Secretary General of the United Nations recently proposed the creation of a readily available United Nations armed force, arguing that a "military option is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as guarantor of international security."<sup>1</sup> His proposal stemmed from the sharp increase in post-Cold War peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, the ominous threat to international peace and security from a plethora of emerging and imploding states, and the growing awareness that national forces for intervention may not always be readily available or reliable. Nations are increasingly interdependent, and, consequently, in search of supranational answers to the problems generated by that interdependency. While military force is a partial solution to the problems of international interdependency and national conflict, that force must be linked with international political will to be effective.

Carl von Clausewitz established a timeless and lucid relationship between war and its political master which has survived the centuries and applies to international as well as national use of force. He defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."<sup>2</sup> It is also a "political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."<sup>3</sup> War is an *act of force*, and subject to political dynamics whether it is wielded by a nation-state

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<sup>1</sup>Trevor Rowe, "U.N. Seeks Permanent Armed Force," *The Washington Post*, June 19, 1992: A29, A30.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. *Carl von Clausewitz On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 75 [Hereinafter referred to as *Clausewitz*].

<sup>3</sup>*Clausewitz*, 87.

or an international body. Clausewitz reinforces this political–military relationship by describing war, or the *act of force*, as a paradoxical trinity comprised of the people, the commander and his army, and the political primacy of the government. "A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."<sup>4</sup> The challenge for the 21st Century strategist is to expand his or her understanding of warfare theory into an international context. Within this context, the Secretary General's proposal might be rephrased as follows: "The ability to exercise political control over a military option is an essential part of the credibility of the United Nations as guarantor of international security."

There is a need for supranational enforcement of international agreements and law. The United Nations is the most logical executor of that authority, but it is not politically decisive enough to effectively organize and employ international military force. Clausewitz would have considered the application of military force under such circumstances "useless" because it violates the governmental "political primacy" element of his trinity theory.

This paper advocates international military force as an alternative to United States unilateralism in the 21st Century world order, recognizing the controversial, but necessary, United Nations political reforms to bring such a force out of the "useless" category and under international political control. Part I establishes the need for an international military force as an alternative to continued United States reactive international intervention. Part II recommends a military force under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, Part III recommends United Nations

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<sup>4</sup>Clausewitz, 89.

political reforms necessary for that body to fulfill its Charter functions, and Part IV offers an international strategy for the employment of military force.

## **I. THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE**

There are five arguments in favor of establishing an international military force. First, the end of the Cold War has yielded a proliferation of emerging and imploding nations with highly publicized human suffering. Not always posing a direct threat to vital U.S. national interests, these "threats of conscience" infiltrate the national security decision-making process of the United States to increase pressure for military intervention. Second, the control of nuclear weapons proliferation, and that of their associated missile delivery systems, is a global concern that will demand the enforcement capability of an international military force in the coming decades. Third, the currently-accepted U.N. military role of peacekeeping is a Cold War paradigm which alone is inadequate for dealing effectively with the broader spectrum of modern international problems. Fourth, a hallmark of the post-Cold War international arena is rising nationalism, and continued unilateral intervention from the United States will conflict with that nationalist sentiment in a way that an international effort might not. Fifth, President Clinton has clearly established domestic security as a top priority, and the subsequent reductions in defense spending will restrict U.S. responsiveness to international crises, making a shared international security force more attractive and affordable than unilateral intervention.

### ***THREATS OF CONSCIENCE***

The defining characteristic of international relations changed dramatically with the end of the cold war. The world can no longer rely upon superpower confrontation to stabilize and patronize lesser developed, third world countries. As a result, some inefficient client-states who

depended upon Soviet or U.S. aid have failed to remain solvent. In the absence of externally imposed order, the former Yugoslav Republics are stripping away the 20th Century to reveal centuries-old ethnic problems. Africa continues to struggle with the aftermath of decolonization and the political turbulence which results from arbitrary boundaries drawn across ethnic and tribal lines. No longer supported by superpower rivalry, struggling nations slide into political bankruptcy, instability, and experience the resultant human suffering.

The widespread political disintegration and human suffering in Bosnia, Armenia, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and Cambodia receive world-wide exposure and lead to demands for intervention to relieve the suffering. If the United States chooses to pursue a strategy of continued reactive unilateral engagement, the list of our enemies will grow and American forces will become spread so thin that intervention when United States' defining national interests are at stake might be impossible. Responding simultaneously to a multitude of "conscience crises" around the world will obscure the political aims of using military force, and trap U.S. forces in civil war scenarios with military objectives, which – once obtained – will have done nothing to correct the political problems which precipitated intervention in the first place. The potentially high number of demands for intervention in the post-Cold War world is a strong argument for an international military force. Sharing the burden on an international basis would allow individual nations to contribute forces to a single problem area, with established internationally acceptable objectives, and without national ties to the outcome of the engagement.

### ***WEAPONS PROLIFERATION***

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but both countries exercised strict

control of their arsenals. The end of the Cold War, however, has been a bittersweet victory for the United States. With the subsequent political crisis in Russia comes an uncertain threat from the leakage of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons technologies to radical or aggressive powers in other parts of the world.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the weapons themselves, there is a corresponding concern for the proliferation of missile delivery systems. Given the devastating consequences of an aggressive, renegade dictator gaining access to nuclear production technology *and* missile delivery capability, there is a pronounced need to consolidate the international community's regulation and enforcement of non-proliferation efforts.

The United Nations has made considerable progress toward this end with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime,<sup>6</sup> but the Security Council does not have the adequate force or political power to enforce treaty violations or agency findings. As an example, U.N. inspection teams are making encouraging progress monitoring Iraqi post-war compliance with nuclear disarmament, but they do so under the protective umbrella of United States military force. The United Nations Security Council needs the political empowerment to direct international military operations against states such as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which threaten world peace and security by violating internationally established non-proliferation agreements and resolutions.

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<sup>5</sup>Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1993) 2.

<sup>6</sup>United Nations, *United Nations Association of The United States of America, A U.N. Revitalized* (New York: United Nations 1992) 9.

**BEYOND PEACEKEEPING**

To envision an international military force is to look beyond the traditional concept of peacekeeping as the only acceptable international military mission. Peacekeeping in today's context is not a specific provision of the United Nations Charter. Article 39 of the Charter specifies that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," but this capability frequently eluded the Security Council during the Cold War due to the prolific use of the Soviet and American veto. The succeeding Articles allow the Security Council to recommend interim measures to promote peace between conflicting nations, to determine U.N. actions which do not involve armed force, and, finally, to require member nations to contribute armed forces and assistance (under Article 43) for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Articles 46 and 47 established a Military Staff Committee to "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions related to the Security Council's military requirements."<sup>7</sup> As a branch of the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee shared the Council's inaction, gridlock, and ineffectiveness, and the intended collective security enforcement capability of the United Nations was replaced by the concept of "peacekeeping between equal disputants."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>*The Charter of the United Nations. Address of the President of the United States, delivered before the Senate on July 2, 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Sess. Senate Doc. 70. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1945) 12. [Hereinafter referred to as Senate Doc. 70.]*

<sup>8</sup>*Ralph M. Goldman, Is it Time to Revive the UN Military Staff Committee, (Los Angeles: California State University 1990) 5.*



In 1950, the General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace Resolution<sup>9</sup> in an effort to circumvent the gridlock of the Security Council and assume more responsibility for international peace and security. The wording of the Resolution reveals the General Assembly's intent to pursue international peace and security in spite of Security Council inaction:

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs,<sup>10</sup> does not relieve member states of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.<sup>11</sup>

Over the years, peacekeeping missions came to reflect the idealistic, noncoercive nature of their sponsoring body. Deemphasizing the application of violence, peacekeeping assumed a constabulary role which only uses force as a last resort and in self defense. In 1975, Charles Moskos, Jr. offered the following definition of a peacekeeping force: "military components from various nations operating under the command of an impartial world body, committed to the absolute minimum use of force, which seeks to reduce or prevent armed hostilities."<sup>12</sup>

This definition highlights the inadequacy of peacekeeping as the sole objective of a military force. First, if military forces are employed under a flag of impartiality or neutrality, they lose that neutrality in any attempt to use force against one of the disputants. Second, the

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<sup>9</sup>Resolution 377A (V) of the General Assembly, 3 November 1950. *General Assembly Official Records, V, Supp.20 (A/1775)*, pp. 10–12.

<sup>10</sup>The preceding paragraphs referenced the Security Council's responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, and its responsibility to negotiate agreements for armed forces provided under Article 43 of the Charter.

<sup>11</sup>Resolution 377A (V) of the General Assembly.

<sup>12</sup>Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "UN Peacekeepers, The Constabulary Ethic and Military Professionalism," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No.4, August 1975, 389.

commitment to absolute minimum use of force can be an aimless, immoral, and dangerous invitation to *escalation* at the expense of peacekeeping force lives. Finally, peacekeeping is not an objective application of military force (which implies a reasoned strategic or tactical enforcement of political policy through offensive or defensive operations). Instead, it seeks to reduce or prevent hostilities by inserting troops as neutral observers of suspended violence. This equates to combat exposure without a mission.

Peacekeeping is valid as an integral *part* of an international military mission, but should not be the primary reason for force employment. Occupation forces might be necessary to ensure treaty compliance following an intervention of international military force, but this is a supporting role subsequent to military operations to establish a peace. An international military force would move beyond the traditional, limiting concept of peacekeeping, incorporating that supporting role into a pursuit of clearly-established international political objectives.

### ***NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS UNILATERAL INTERVENTION***

National sovereignty is an issue often used to argue against an empowered United Nations, but it is also a powerful argument against prolific, unilateral U.S. intervention. Nationalist sentiment is an increasingly prevalent signature of post-Cold War international conflict. Ethnic demands for national recognition are surfacing in the newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union, and the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia is a powder keg of ethnic nationalism. The European countries recognize the limitations imposed by their own history of Balkan intervention and have avoided unilateral involvement. Regardless of United States intentions, a continued strategy of unilateral international engagement will, at

the outset, conflict with nationalist sentiments and threaten the sovereignty of established nation-states.

This is the same rationale used to justify federal monitoring and control of interstate issues in the United States. The State of California is larger and wealthier than the State of Oregon, but both are sovereign states within the federal system. Oregon would resent and oppose Californian intervention in its internal state affairs, but accepts federal, supra-state mediation as a consequence of national identity. International crises likewise demand international solutions, diminishing the exclusive sanctity of national sovereignty in favor of a trend toward international authority. Given the increased number of emerging republics seeking to define their nationalism and the number of existing nations which are in danger of disintegration, unilateral American intervention will be increasingly inappropriate. Armed intervention in these cases requires an international military force which can confront national sovereignty with the backing of international legitimacy.

### ***DOMESTIC SECURITY***

The final argument for an international military force is this nation's need to bolster its own domestic security. The United States is a superpower because of its traditionally robust economic and political base; it does not derive its political and economic system from its superpower status. The United States is an unchallenged superpower with no designs for territorial expansion or colonization but in serious need of domestic revitalization. Neglecting this element of national power in pursuit of reactive military engagement invites a gradual erosion of the American reputation as an honest broker, and ignores the reality of the future economic battlefield.

Rebuilding America's domestic national power is essential to the country's survival on the international economic front. The United States can not compete effectively in the world market without restoring its status as a creditor nation, and one of the initial steps in that process is reducing the federal budget deficit. Reductions in defense spending are an integral part of the administration's economic plan and these cuts will restrict U.S. responsiveness to international crises, making an international military force more attractive and affordable than U.S. unilateral intervention.

## **II. OPTIONS FOR APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE**

International military force might be described as the armed intervention of supranational forces in national political or military crises for the continuance of international policy. Its use assumes that national political or military forces have upset international peace and security by transgressing against another nation, or have lost governing effectiveness due to internal destabilization or disintegration. Its use also assumes that the military forces employed operate under international legitimacy with no other national objectives of conquest or seizure.

The issue confronting the United States and the international community is the "who" and "how" of employing international military force to defend transgressed or politically disintegrating nations which are otherwise helpless. Three options for such a force are (1) unilateral or nationally-led coalition forces which operate independently of United Nations command, but under its legitimacy, (2) regional collective security forces, or (3) an international military force according to Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

***Option One: National Forces Backed by International Legitimacy***

This is the post–Cold War status quo. The United States acts as the guarantor of international peace and security by marshaling international consensus to support unilateral or coalition intervention. The United States exercises unilateral leadership by taking the initiative to energize the international community. The resulting military force may be entirely American or an international coalition which operates independently of the United Nations, but with Security Council concurrence. The use of international military force during Operation Desert Storm was an example of this option, underscoring the synergistic relationship between the United States and the United Nations. Lacking effective military power or the political consensus to employ it, the United Nations relies upon the United States for enforcement muscle. As a sovereign nation among other sovereign nations, the United States relies on the United Nations for international legitimacy in gaining the support of coalition allies. International military force under this option operates in a grey area of the Clausewitzian trinity theory, balanced precipitously between national and international application and unable to stand alone.

The United States can, of course, intervene unilaterally with its own forces anywhere and anytime, but it can not always be guaranteed coalition allies or international backing. Option one allows the United States to maintain the status quo, but not indefinitely. It does not deal with the difficult question of consistency, or determine which countries respond to international crises if the United States is unwilling or unable to respond. The cost of this option is the continued expenditure of American blood and treasure from a reactive posture, and the international community's growing resentment of perceived U.S. hegemonic encroachment.

*Option Two: Regional Collective Security*

Regional collective security fashioned after the political–military integration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an attractive, albeit limited, option for international military force. NATO is a useful study in transnational standardization and doctrinal integration, but it is a treaty–based organization which, heretofore, has been held together by American political influence and the threat of Soviet aggression. The treaty or "agreement" basis of regional security will limit the usefulness of international military force beyond what the signatory states consider in their own narrow interests and may, in fact, plant the seeds of future regional or inter–regional conflict.

Regional collective security is also limited by historic animosities. The key power brokers of a regional alliance may simply be too close to the situation to objectively maintain peace and security. This was evident in European reluctance to intervene in Bosnia–Hercegovina due to Germany's history of harsh military measures during World War II. In like manner, Japanese participation in a Pacific collective security force could be hampered by apprehensive regional memories of her World War II aggression.

The most compelling argument against regional collective security as an option for international military force is its long term effect on U.S. interests. Without the world–wide threat of Soviet aggression, the United States' political capital in world affairs has diminished. Encouraging collective security agreements could accelerate the pace of regional polarization to the exclusion of the United States. Regional alliances invariably promote regional interests and the long term effect of U.S. isolation from these regional affairs could be economically, politically, and militarily damaging. The United States can avoid regional exclusion by

promoting the United Nations as the international forum for dealing with transnational problems and maintaining international peace and security.

*Option Three: United Nations Military Force*

A third option for maintaining international peace and security is to establish a United Nations military force under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. According to the provisions of Article 43:

All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.<sup>13</sup>

Article 43 forces are national forces which would be "made available" to the Security Council. They are not intended to be standing U.N. forces, beyond being trained and available. The size and force structure of an Article 43 military force would be determined by the Security Council based on the recommendation of a fully implemented Military Staff committee.

There are several advantages to an Article 43 United Nations Force. First, it would be a truly supranational force which could be employed intrusively for the continuance of internationally agreed upon policy. An Article 43 force could have the full weight of international legitimacy behind its employment, and would not be handicapped by regional prejudice.

Second, a U.N. international force complements the current trend toward military demobilization among member nations. An international force would pool the military

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<sup>13</sup>*Senate Doc. 70, 12.*

capabilities of down-sized national forces into a sum greater than the individual parts. Simple arithmetic reveals the significant concentration of forces available if each of the fifteen members of the Security Council contributes one division to an international military force. This would also solve the U.S. dilemma over force structure determination by taking the guess-work out of threat projection and international commitment. Designated Article 43 forces would contribute to the United Nations' maintenance of international peace and security, while the balance of U.S. forces could be structured as necessary to protect unilateral interests and defend the homeland.

Third, the international political development necessary to create and control an Article 43 force would diffuse international reliance on regional alliances, strengthening the U.S. role in transitional world leadership. Rather than attempting to maintain influence in and among several regional alliances, the U.S. could maintain a global influence by bringing regional political-military issues into the United Nations.

Fourth, a U.N. military force would provide an acceptable alternative to German and Japanese constitutional limitations to employing their national military forces beyond their borders. Supporting an Article 43 force would allow these two former "enemy states" to fully integrate into the international community, contributing to world peace and security without reviving collective memories of axis aggression.

In spite of its advantages, the option of an Article 43 U.N. military force is limited by the political handicaps of the United Nations. *If* this option is to be the foundation of a new world order, the cost will be political reform within the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, as well as resurrection of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.



### III. UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL REFORMS

If the United Nations is to provide an effective alternative to U.S. led or initiated international crisis intervention, it must be empowered through political reform. If the international community perceives the United Nations as responsible for solving world security problems, it must be given the requisite authority to fulfill those responsibilities. This process may signal some additional infringement of national sovereignty among member states, but such is the price of government. Governments derive their ability to employ military force from the political will of the people they represent. If the United Nations remains a politically impotent international organization, it has no responsible use for military force. If, however, the represented member nations desire that this body should have and exercise international authority, then they must empower it with that authority and be prepared to accept its decisions.

Before the United Nations can exercise effective political primacy over military force, its Charter must be amended to provide for a Security Council veto override and to establish flexible criteria for permanent membership on the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee of the Security Council should be fully implemented to fulfill its Charter functions and the Trusteeship Council provisions of the Charter should be revived to enhance the political development of struggling nations.

Without the immobilizing gridlock of the Security Council veto, the U.N. can deal authoritatively with international issues, working through the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council to find alternative solutions to national confrontations. Should international military force become necessary, the Security Council will have the representative political clout of its member nations supporting it and the strategic direction of the Military Staff

Committee to focus its efforts. These are controversial measures, but controversy alone is insufficient to abridge their relevance or disqualify them from consideration.

## ***SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS***

### ***THE VETO***

The Security Council was intended to be the agent of prompt and effective action by the United Nations, empowered with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Instead, it became the symbol of Cold War gridlock and ineffectiveness; a victim of one small, but powerful phrase. Article 27 of the U.N. Charter states that "decisions of the Security Council on all other matters (non-procedural) shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine<sup>14</sup> members *including the concurring votes of the permanent members*."<sup>15</sup> Intended by the "Great Power" victors of World War II to preserve their own interests, the requirement for permanent member unanimity became a veto, effectively eliminating any chance of political consensus through the Security Council if one permanent member perceived a conflict of interest.

The Security Council veto was an intended functioning of the Charter. It was a product of the Cold War, designed to accommodate bipolar superpower confrontation and permit only superficial United Nations action. Cold War confrontational stability between the United States and the Soviet Union filled any void left by the veto-induced Security Council stalemate, and continuance of international veto-politics will require that the United States maintain a corresponding level of international presence. Without significant reform, the United Nations

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<sup>14</sup>Originally seven, the required number became nine when the Security Council's membership was expanded to fifteen by amendment in 1963.

<sup>15</sup>Louis B. Sohn, ed. Basic Documents of the United Nations (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1968) 8. [Hereinafter referred to as Sohn.]

Charter will continue to hold the international community and the United States budget hostage to the unlikely continuance of harmony among the permanent members of the Security Council, and eliminate a serious United Nations role in maintaining international peace and security. The end of the Cold War has provided a temporary respite from Security Council veto immobilization but if, and when, the current "global harmony ceases, the political machinery, unchanged, will prove to be just as inadequate as during the Cold War."<sup>16</sup>

To prevent future Security Council gridlock, Article 27 of the U.N. Charter should be amended to allow General Assembly override of a permanent member non-procedural dissention, or veto. If a permanent member vetoes a Security Council resolution which otherwise has the requisite nine votes, the amendment should allow any voting member of the Security Council to take the veto to the General Assembly for override. Taking the resolution to the General Assembly would require an additional affirmative vote of nine within the Security Council, including a majority vote of the permanent members, then a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly for override. Requiring a majority vote (three) of the permanent members allows protection against a Cold War-type arbitrary veto by requiring a veto-wielding member to convince the other permanent members of the validity of his or her rationale in order to stop an override bid. The Security council as a whole might not want to take every veto to the General Assembly, hence the requirement for an override vote which is not automatic but must be requested by a member of the Security Council.

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<sup>16</sup>Major Keith L. Sellen, "The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order", *Military Law Review*, Volume 138 Fall 1992, 190.

Upgrading the authority of the General Assembly and curtailing the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council headed the list of urgently needed United Nations reforms at a recent summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement.<sup>17</sup> Providing a veto override provision restores a political decision-making capability to the United Nations which is essential to its ability to represent the interests of all member nations, not just those of the permanent members of the Security Council. Absolute veto power within the Security Council encourages reliance on unilateral armed force because it discourages problem solving processes among the permanent members. Overcoming the Security Council gridlock by providing an alternative to the absolute veto will enable that body to come together as problem solvers instead of adversaries, ensuring more effective maintenance of international peace and security. Without veto reform, the United Nations Security Council is not likely to achieve fulfillment of its intended Charter functions. Continued international veto-politics will increase the likelihood of a widely-dispersed U.S. engagement posture and do nothing to prepare the country or the international community for the emerging interdependency of the 21st Century.

#### *CRITERIA FOR PERMANENT MEMBER STATUS*

Article 23 of the United Nations Charter simply states that, of the Security Council member nations, The Republic of China (China), France, the USSR (Russia), Great Britain, and the United States are permanent members. There is an elaborate process for determining the nonpermanent members and limiting their consecutive membership, but none for revising permanent membership status or establishing such criteria. The United Nations Charter has an

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<sup>17</sup>William Branigin, "North and South Stand Worlds Apart on Reform," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1992, A1, A32.

obvious tie to the outcome of World War II, haunting the international community with antiquated thinking and rearward vision instead of providing a framework for international development and cooperation into the 21st Century.

Russia is an excellent example of this obsolete, non-policy of permanent membership status. Racked by hyperinflation, economically defunct, and politically fragmented, she enjoys continued permanent membership status along with its absolute power to prevent Security Council action anywhere in the world. This power is by virtue of possessing (though not necessarily controlling) large numbers of nuclear weapons and submarines, and by virtue of being a victor nation at the end of World War II. The first reason is the most plausible although it raises the question of other nuclear countries, such as India, which are politically intact but not permanent members of the Security Council. The second reason, that of being a victor nation at the end of World War II, was valid 45 years ago but invalid on its own merits today.

Permanent membership status should be a reflection of a nation's relative power in the international community. Quantifiable membership criteria should include Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the percentage of GDP spent on defense, and the per capita income of its population. Qualitative criteria should include popular governmental self-determination, human rights record, and environmental record. Defense expenditure as a criteria is not intended to elevate the importance of military spending, but to assess a nation's ability to contribute to an international force and participate fairly in decisions concerning its employment. Japan and Germany, for example, might seem to be appropriate candidates for permanent membership based on economic power, but would lack military force credibility due to their constitutional restrictions against projecting national force. Russia, conversely, has credible military power but

is an economic and political third world country. The time is right for the international community to look forward to the next century and assess what criteria is critical for future world leadership.

#### *THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE*

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) of the Security Council was originally conceived as a "Joint Chiefs of Staff" of a global defense network through which the Security Council would maintain international peace and security. Article 46 of the U.N. Charter established the Military Staff Committee to assist the Security Council in planning for the application of armed force. Article 47 further assigns advisory roles in determining military requirements, command relationships, employment of forces, and disarmament. Unfortunately, the MSC became the first victim of the Cold War feud between the United States and the Soviet Union which immobilized the Security Council and shifted military oversight to the General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

Fully implementing the Military Staff Committee is essential if the Security Council is to effectively employ military force. The responsibilities of the Military Staff Committee should include determining the necessary size and structure of available U.N. military forces, developing contingency plans to task-organize on-call forces into a United Nations Task Force (UNTF), recommend national composition and command of a UNTF, develop contingency plans to mobilize member nations for large scale theater operations, and conduct combined exercises among contributing forces to maintain readiness.

*Determine Force Structure.* An autonomous, independent U.N. military force would be too unwieldy and would result in excessive duplication of effort. A preferable approach would

be for the Security Council to give the MSC broad guidance concerning the nature and extent of its potential military missions, with the MSC making subsequent recommendations as to the size and structure of the required forces. The MSC would then track the availability and location of those forces and recall them when necessary to fulfill a Security Council military mission.

*Develop Contingency Plans.* The MSC would develop contingency plans to task-organize assigned forces into a United Nations Task force (UNTF) according to varying threats and requirements, then rapidly mobilize, transport, and resupply it for a given period of time. Further plans would be developed to mobilize member nations to meet a larger scale threat to international stability, and conduct offensive or defensive operations on a theater level.

*Recommend National Composition and Command of UNTF.* Given accurate knowledge of assigned national forces under Article 43, and the political sensitivities of a given objective area, the MSC would recommend the composition of national forces within a United Nations Task Force. It would also recommend command relationships within the task force considering the preponderance of national forces assigned and the level of command required.

*Conduct and Supervise Combined Exercises Among Contributing Forces.* To maintain readiness of national forces to assume international missions, the MSC would conduct exercises among national forces on a rotating basis. The exercises should be designed to duplicate as closely as possible the requirement to task-organize, mobilize, transport, and resupply national forces from different member states.

A fully implemented Military Staff committee would give the Security Council the essential capability to formulate the size and structure of an international military force based on

politically established objectives and missions. Military forces would be organized, trained, and equipped to fulfill specific missions in continuance of international policy.

### ***POLICY BEFORE FORCE***

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter describes the purposes and principles of the U.N. as maintaining international peace and security, establishing friendly relations among nations, and achieving international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.<sup>18</sup> The inclusion of a paragraph concerning economic and social problems in the first article of the Charter indicates that the founding members recognized the symptomatic nature of war and conflict. Long before there is a breach of peace or outbreak of civil war, there are political, economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian problems that defy internal solution and complicate the intervention of "foreign" national forces.

A key challenge before the United Nations in the coming years will be to recognize the early symptoms of internal political disintegration among struggling nations and provide the political, economic, or social development assistance necessary to avert that disintegration before having to resort to armed force. The Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council are possible organizations of the U.N. which, through reform or revitalization, could provide early answers to problems before they escalate into armed conflict.

### ***THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL***

The Economic and Social Council is a twenty-seven member organization elected by the General Assembly and subject to its authority.<sup>19</sup> It is largely a bureaucratic body, empowered

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<sup>18</sup>*Senate Doc. 70, 4.*

<sup>19</sup>*Sohn, 15.*



by the Charter to make or initiate studies concerning international problems of an economic and social nature, make recommendations, draft conventions, and call international conferences. Article 68 further empowers the Council to establish commissions in economic and social fields as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Among the intergovernmental organizations established by the Economic and Social Council are the International Labor Organization; the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the International Monetary Fund; the World Health Organization; and the Universal Postal Union.<sup>20</sup> In recognition of the prolific threats of conscience from both newly-independent and disintegrating nations, the Economic and Social Council should establish an "International Organization for Political Development." Its task would be to develop guidelines for the early recognition of problems which could lead to civil war or armed conflict, and for the application of such international assistance as may be necessary to provide political development and forestall or prevent that conflict. The International Organization for Political Development would monitor the status of nations such as Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan and make recommendations to the General Assembly and Security Council for follow-on action.

### *THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL*

The International Trusteeship System established by Article 77 of the United Nations Charter originally applied to territories held under mandate from the League of Nations,

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<sup>20</sup>*The United Nations Department of Public Information, Guide to the Charter of the United Nations, 4th Edition, (New York: United Nations Publications, 1955) 33-34.*

territories which were detached from enemy states as a result of World War II, and territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. Article 77 is strongly influenced by the outcome of the Second World War and by the increasing trend toward independence as a result of European decolonization. The trusteeship system relied heavily on member nations which assumed responsibility for trust territory administration. Out of respect for their sovereign equality, Article 78 prohibits establishing member nations as trust territories.

A renewed United Nations Trusteeship System based upon the reality of political disintegration within nation-states could provide an international alternative to fill the void between sovereignty and emerging self-determination.<sup>21</sup> Trusteeship must be voluntarily accepted by an emerging state (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina) or assigned by the Security Council to an imploding state (such as Somalia) where no functioning government exists to accept or deny trusteeship. Rather than assigning other member states as administration authorities, the United Nations should assume that responsibility through "Field Operating Commissions" of the Trusteeship Council. These Commissions would administer trust territories such as Somalia, according to the guidelines established by the International Organization for Political Development and for specified periods to allow for periodic review by the Trusteeship Council of the territory's progress toward self-determination. Dealing with the political bankruptcy which often results in armed conflict and human suffering is an infinitely more rational approach to threats of conscience than military intervention due to political inaction. Political will is the key

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<sup>21</sup>Christopher C. Joyner, "United Nations Trusteeship and Political Development: Rethinking the Prospects for Future Application," *The Security roles of the United Nations*, Proceedings of the Conference Sponsored by National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 9&10, 1991 87.

to a successfully renewed U.N. trusteeship system, and that political will must flow from the sincere commitment of the Great Powers to United Nations political reform.<sup>22</sup>

#### IV. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCE

An Article 43 United Nations Military Force should be employed as a tool to achieve or enforce international political objectives. In developing a strategy for the employment of that force, particular attention should first be given to developing an international political strategy for the United Nations. Central to a long term U.N. political strategy is its ability to assume a supranational posture in relation to its member nations, particularly the ability of the Security Council to reach a consensus which is not threatened by the veto of a single permanent member. If the Security Council is unable to act due to the objection of one member, it has no political will and should not use military force. If the Security Council can break out of its Cold War paradigm and achieve a consensus decision-making capability, the international community can move forward and forge constructive strategies to fulfill the original intentions of the U.N. Charter.

There are three broad strategic contexts for the employment of international military force: *protecting* the process of political, economic, and social development; *enforcing* United Nations policy and resolutions; and *detering* aggression among nations. Protecting the process of international political, economic, and social development is an essential strategy to elevate the primacy of government over the use of force. If the United Nations is to stay ahead of social disintegration and political chaos, it must become involved in the early stages before armed force

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<sup>22</sup>Joyner, "United Nations Trusteeship," 87.

is the only option. An example might be a "Field Operating Commission" of the Trusteeship Council, deployed to a country on the verge of political disintegration to determine the causes of the conflict and offer assistance. The Security Council, assessing potential military threat to the Commission from hostile factions, would deploy an Article 43 force to protect the process of political development and allow the Commission to mediate the dispute. Under these circumstances, the Article 43 force would be employed with the specific objective of protecting a political process. Its rules of engagement would be to conduct decisive military operations against any factions or forces which threaten the peaceful process of United Nations policy.

The second strategic context for the employment of international military force is enforcement of United Nations policy and resolutions. In the event of blatant aggression, or uncooperative national behavior which violates United Nations resolutions to the point of endangering international peace and security, the Security Council will identify the aggressor state or wrongful perpetrator and dispatch a United Nations Task Force. The UNTF will conduct military operations against the aggressor or perpetrator to achieve the international political objectives as established by the Security Council. The UNTF would be comprised of available national forces task-organized by the Military Staff Committee according to mission, geographic, and political considerations. The peace which is established by the UNTF may require further administration by the United Nations and, consequently, further protection by international military forces, but these are non-neutral planned applications of force in continuance of international policy as opposed to peacekeeping forces mandated by an absence of international action.

Deterrence as a strategic context is a haunting reminder of the Cold War, but in terms of its international application it is a novel concept. The United States and the Soviet Union deterred one another from nuclear war and, to some extent, established behavioral boundaries for the greater community of affected nations, but the international community's ability to deter aggression through collective force of will has yet to be demonstrated. This is not to imply that deterrence through international force of will is impossible, only to stress that it has not been given an opportunity due to Security Council veto-politics.

Historically, aggressors have not fared well against *ad hoc* international coalitions. Several examples illustrate the apparent superiority of combined will over indiscriminate aggression – the Allied Seventh Coalition<sup>23</sup> over Napoleon, the Allied forces over Germany in both World Wars, United Nations forces over North Korea, and the Allied coalition over Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. Without attempting to revise history, it is useful to consider whether these aggressors would have been so bold had they known that an international body, having access to a superior armed force and the political will to use it, would be their ultimate opponent. Nations have proven their ability to come together and repel aggression after suffering tremendous damage, and aggressor nations have demonstrated a propensity for "testing the water" in a gamble that their violations of international peace and security will go unopposed. Empowering the United Nations through political control of international military force will send a clear signal to potential aggressors that the water is too hot.

Protection, enforcement, and deterrence are the broad strategic contexts for the employment of international military force, but these strategies are useless without an active

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<sup>23</sup>Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1991) 513.

United Nations political strategy of reform and international involvement. By actively pursuing a strategy of political, economic, and social development, the United Nations can "get out in front" of conflict resolution and provide the objective framework for military force if armed intervention becomes necessary.

## CONCLUSION

There are many convincing arguments for an international military force under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, not the least of which is reducing the United States' burden as a world police force. United States domestic security concerns demand decreased international military involvement at the same time that the international situation demands more. Pursuing a strategy of reactive unilateral intervention is a costly, inefficient, and short-sighted alternative to correcting the United Nations' infrastructure deficiencies and empowering the international community to help itself. As in any consolidation of popular political will, however, there is a cost, and there will be considerable U.S. reluctance to accept the perceived loss of national sovereignty inherent in these United Nations reforms. To put American reluctance to accept an empowered United Nations into perspective, consider the words of a state delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787:

We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign states, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our states who have sent us here for other purposes?...I will never consent to the present system, and I shall make all the interest against it in the state which I represent that I can. Myself or my state will never submit to tyranny or despotism.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Jeffrey St. John, *Constitutional Journal*, (Ottawa, Ill.: Jameson books, Inc., 1987) 51.

This does not equate United Nations political reforms to the framing of the United States Constitution nor impart any particular state's proportional stature to the United States. It merely illustrates that traditional perceptions sometimes cloud strategic vision. The concept of national sovereignty evolved out of the political, economic, and social realities between the fifteenth and late seventeenth centuries.<sup>24</sup> International interdependency today demands new thinking and foresight instead of inflexible devotion to five-hundred-year-old concepts. The realities of the twenty-first century may force a reevaluation of national sovereignty as the defining characteristic of international cooperation, in much the same way that states-rights advocates grappled with the emergence of a United States federal government in 1787.

As the international community seeks political plurality through United Nations reform, it is important to remember that the reform is not merely for reform's sake, but to establish the political primacy of the international community for the purpose of conflict resolution. The goal is not only to establish an international military force, but to empower the political base of the United Nations in order to actively address international problems which result in armed conflict. Only then will there be a legitimate political foundation for the employment of international military force.

The United States is at the crossroads of National Security Strategy. If the political cost of an effective international military force is too high, then we must seek other alternatives to the status-quo. If we are indeed on the threshold of a "new world order," however, we have a unique window of opportunity to empower the United Nations and chart a new course of transitional world leadership into the 21st Century.

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<sup>24</sup>Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987) 70.

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